Dec
24
2010

Definition: Safety Factor

Safety factor: an event or condition that increases safety risk. In other words, it is something that, if it occurred in the future, would increase the likelihood of an occurrence, and/or the severity of the adverse consequences associated with an occurrence. Safety factors include the occurrence events (e.g. engine failure, signal passed at danger, grounding), individual actions (e.g. errors and violations), local conditions, current risk controls and organisational influences.

Source: Australian Transport Safety Bureau: Preliminary Safety Report: In-flight uncontained engine failure overhead Batam Island, Indonesia 4 November 2010: http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1419.pdf

Click here to see a list of definitions that can be found in this blog

Written by Max in: Safety | Tags:
Dec
24
2010

Definition: Safety issue

Safety issue: a safety factor that (a) can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations, and (b) is a characteristic of an organisation or a system, rather than a characteristic of a specific individual, or characteristic of an operational environment at a specific point in time.

Source: Australian Transport Safety Bureau: Preliminary Safety Report: In-flight uncontained engine failure overhead Batam Island, Indonesia 4 November 2010: http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1419.pdf

Click here to see a list of definitions that can be found in this blog

Written by Max in: Safety | Tags:
Dec
24
2010

Definition: Safety Action

Safety action: the steps taken or proposed to be taken by a person, organisation or agency in response to a safety issue.

Source: Australian Transport Safety Bureau: Preliminary Safety Report: In-flight uncontained engine failure overhead Batam Island, Indonesia 4 November 2010: http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1419.pdf

Click here to see a list of definitions that can be found in this blog

Written by Max in: Safety | Tags:
Dec
09
2010

The ATC situation in Spain

It is hard for an ATM blog not to comment on the Spanish ATC situation. However, it is also hard to comment when you lack the details of the situation and when you are aware that a lot of what has been said is not true.

Having said the above, some things are nevertheless clear enough:

There is a conflict between the Spanish Government and AENA management on one side and the controllers, represented by their trade union on the other. This conflict has seriously grown in proportion [and out of it] in the recent months.

The conditions of the controllers have been severely degraded over the past year. The degradation has been drastic.

The financial situation of AENA [and of the Spanish state] seems very difficult.

The controllers walked out of their working positions on Friday the 3rd of December. This action was and could be interpreted as a ‘savage’ – but pre-meditated strike as it fell on the beginning of a long week end in Spain, but the situation seems to be more complex, but I fail to understand exactly what trigerred it on 3/12.

Without passing judgements into who is right or guilty, I think that in any conflict every side has its responsibilities to bear.  However, my sympathy and worry goes with the individuals who are or could potentially be affected by this conflict:

My sympathies go to the many professional controllers out there, who are now working under very stressful conditions, being requisitioned under military rule. These people have seen their situation severely degrade [and overnight] in the past. They have been ordered to work very long hours [I read the figure of 1840 hours per year, which if true, even if it includes operational breaks during duties, and assuming that these breaks are of reasonable duration, is very long].  They have also seen their net income reduced drastically overnight, as what they previously they used to earn as over time, is now part of their decreed working hours.  I sympathise because I used to be a controller and because I am a family man, and I can imagine how stressful it could be for a responsible person to deal with loss of income vis a vis commitments his family has [education, house loan, etc.] and at the same time seeing that their profession is being degraded in a severe way.

I sympathise mostly because as far as I know these people never stole anything from anyone.  One could argue that they have used their strong position in the past to acquire certain conditions. Maybe it is true, but who would not try? And they were given their conditions, they did not steal them. So why are they now treated as robbers?  I sympathise, because other less responsible industries [I am thinking of banks and their financial cousins] screwed up severely by acting irresponsibly [and to a certain extend by abusing the system] and yet governments went out to save them – with not many questions asked. With the result that one can still argue that they are still acting irresponsibly [I think of banks not lending money and to the quick redistribution of bonuses to the same clan who screwed up some months prior]. Yes I sympathise with the controllers.

I am also worried about my profession which is about delivering safe air traffic control. And which should be seen as a very satisfying profession. I have serious worries about how the levels of safety can be maintained when the persons providing them are working under severely degraded, stressful and demotivating conditions. I am worried about the air travelling public.

As I said in the beginning, the situation is not easy on both sides. There must be misunderstandings from both sides. Both sides are under severe pressure because the general situation [partly thanks to the banks!] is very tense. The situation needs to be resolved. I hope and wish that both parties show an exceptional sense of responsibility and maturity to find a sustainable solution for all those involved. And if a win-win situation is too optimistic to hope for, I hope that both will try to seek a situation which at least is one of dignity and where the scars are limited on both parties.

Dec
06
2010

Information on the Qantas A380-800 Engine Failure of 4/11/2010

I have just read an Article on Skybrary on the uncontained engine failure that suffered the Qantas A-380-800 a month and two days ago.

The article is quite detailed. It is the first time that I easily find such detailed information on an incident in such a short span of time.  Keep it up Skybrary!

Amongst others, it describes how the crew had to respond to the engine failure as well as a high number of messages of secondary failures. Quoting the article some of these messages were:

  • Engines 1 and 4 operating in degraded mode (some air data or engine parameters are not available)
  • GREEN hydraulic system (powered by engines 1 & 2) – low system pressure and low fluid level
  • YELLOW hydraulic system (powered by engines 3 & 4) – engine 4 pump errors
  • Failure of AC bus 1 and AC Bus 2
  • Flight controls operating in alternate law (some flight control protections reduced)
  • Wing slats inoperative
  • Reduced aileron control
  • Reduced spoiler control
  • Landing gear control and indicator warnings
  • Multiple brake system messages
  • Engine anti-ice and air data sensor messages
  • Multiple fuel system messages, including a fuel jettison fault (the latter fault precluded the jettison of fuel which would normally be made when a long haul air turn back is made to avoid a significantly overweight landing)
  • Centre of gravity messages

To note that the flight crew for this flight was composed of 5 persons:

• the aircraft Captain, as pilot in command (PIC)
• the First Officer (FO), acting as copilot
• a Second Officer (SO)
• a second Captain, who was undergoing training as a Check Captain (CC)
• a Supervising Check Captain (SCC), who was overseeing the training of the CC.

What will also be interesting but which does not come clear from the preliminary report is the extent of the contribution of a 5 person flight crew had over the positive resolution of the incident [i.e. successful landing and evacuation, 0 injuries]. Were 5 better than 2? To what extent? how? Or were they of hindrance?  How did they distribute the roles? Etc. Would a 2 person flight crew have sufficed?

I guess these human factors considerations will be delved into during the full report…

The article contains the safety recommendation, a couple of pictures  of the damaged engine as well as a link to the preliminary report which was issued on 3/12/10 [more pics in the preliminary report]

For the Skybrary article, click here.

Dec
02
2010

EASA and SESAR will cooperate closely in the future – or how Eurocontrol will do the cindirella

I read recently on the SESAR JU website how SESAR and EASA will cooperate closely in the future. This is positive news, however what interested me more was the last phrase but one of this communication:

“The participation of Eurocontrol’s safety experts is foreseen to support EASA in this activity.”

So SESAR gets help from EASA who gets help from Eurocontrol to help SESAR*.

If I had to compare it to a fairy tail, from the title it seems to me that the prima donnas are SESAR and EASA [that is what makes the news] but that Eurocontrol takes the role of cindirella by strongly supporting both [and gets a little mention in the end of the communiqué]. The days when cindirella was the beloved daughter of a kind and rich lady are long gone, now she is simply at the service of her step-sisters.

Will the prince ever come to save cindirella from her fate?

*And let’s not forget that Eurocontrol is a founding member of the SESAR JU.

Written by Max in: Business,SES | Tags: , , ,

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