ASAS – part 2, new applications repeating old mistakes?
I have attended a very interesting seminar on the state of things regarding ASAS – Airborne Separation Assistance System – related applications.
The seminar was very interesting and I am sure that a lot of the applications [and from what I could understand in this remit we define application as the grouping of the technology, the functionalities and the procedures to achieve a goal] that are being developed, and which for some will be developed in the short term whilst others are for the longer term, will have a strong impact on AT[C]M and will be of an improvement to the system.
However,  as the title indicates, there is an aspect that I found worrying, which is the grouping of standardisation of specification and procedures together with a deep understanding on the human factor implications that the introduction of such applications will have on the system.
What worries me is that, from what I could indirectly understand during the seminar is that ICAO [there was no official ICAO stand on the issue presented] is severly lagging behind in this area, and is ready to let the systems to be specified, certified and used at local level before it specifies the functionalities, the performance levels and the procedures for use at a global level.
Some during the seminar compared the attitude to ACAS [the standard] and TCAS [the application] where ICAO let the application become operational before it made an attempt to coin the standard. And this led to results many of us know of including:
- Lack of understanding of the human factor implications
- Procedures which were updated [refined] numerous times as experience was gained, which left many grey areas in how controllers and pilots had to react to the system
- Even though there existed a real need for a safety net such as ACAS, the solution was mainly driven by the technology related stakeholders.
I have already written about the way I perceive these problems in a previous article on ACAS so enough on that, but I am afraid that we are repeating the same mistakes where:
- Those driving the development of the ASAS applications are under estimating the impact they will have on the humans in the ATM system and as a result
- They are not investing sufficient effort [at least it seems so as for example none of the 18 presentations I followed during the seminar considered human factors] on human factors
- There does not seem to be leadership from a functional point of view, and the leadership seems to be industrial and technology driven [There were no presentations from - or considering the viewpoint of - the pilots and controllers who will use the applications]
With the results risking of being similar to the ACAS experience where we have valuable applications but which have serious shortcomings with regard of the understanding of the interaction with the humans who operate them resulting into serious safety problems.
So what can we do about it?
Well the human performance / factors / safety / training community as well as the ATCO and Pilot professional associations need to wake up to this problem. We need to start getting involved and start lobbying on the issue.
We need to take the position that these applications NEED to be implemented, but they NEED to be implemented with the proper study on how they will interact with the humans in the system. They need to be developed in harmony with the system including the humans. The role, responsibility, task, cognitive process changes of the human actors need to be well studied and adapted to the birth of these applications. Adapted and appropriate procedures need to be written and training provided to those who need to make the shift to the new applications. Recruitment analysis and training for new recruits need to change…
There is a lot to be done, but it can be done.
As for me, this is the second time I am writing on ASAS, I have also written on other occasions on the future of ATC. I will also continue to influence in as much as I can, from my position for others to start acting on this…
Only time will tell [and hopefully it doesn't] if the same mistake as with ACAS/TCAS is repeated…

